The Court rejected all three limbs of the Bank’s defence.
Intention to create legal relations
The commitment letter clearly stated that the Bank’s obligations were conditional upon its “satisfactory review and completion of documentation”. However, Mr Justice Leggatt decided that the Bank could not unilaterally reject the Transaction and the decision of its board of directors not to proceed with the transaction – when communicated to Novus - amounted to an anticipatory breach of the contract contained in the commitment letter which Novus accepted as putting an end to the contract.
In giving judgement, the court relied heavily on the nature of the language used and on the inclusion of particular provisions in the commitment letter which dispelled any doubt about whether there was an intention for it to be legally binding. For example:
A number of provisions included the language – Party X “shall…” – which were considered clearly to impose actual obligations on the parties; and
There was a clause which provided that the bank “covenants to pay all transaction costs” and the court found that “covenants” was quintessentially the language of a legal obligation.
The inclusion of a governing law and jurisdiction provision was of itself held to be sufficient evidence to conclude that the letter was legally binding.
In giving judgement it was acknowledged that it was, in principle, possible for an agreement to have some parts that were intended to be binding and other parts that were not. Nevertheless, the judgement concluded that there was an expectation that the “distinction between the two qualitatively different types of provision” should be clearly stated. In this case, that distinction was considered not to be clear.
As to the contention that the commitment letter was void on account of uncertainty, the Court held that since the intention of the parties to be legally bound by the document had been objectively demonstrated, the seeming lack of certainty in the terms of the document did not constitute sufficient grounds to render the agreement void.
Lack of authority
The Court found that Novus was entitled to rely on the signatory’s apparent authority to bind the Bank, even though the Bank had specific procedures in place that required two signatories.
Lack of countersignature
Turning to the lack of countersignature, the Court looked instead at the actions and conduct of the parties after the letter was agreed. The Court found that both parties had conducted themselves in a manner which was consistent with the conclusion that the commitment letter was legally binding. English courts are increasingly unimpressed with technical arguments raised by parties which are considered to fly in the face of commercial reality.