Supreme Court of Canada recognizes labour arbitrators’ exclusive jurisdiction over alleged human rights violations

In Northern Regional Health Authority v. Horrocks (Horrocks),¹ the majority of the SCC found that a human rights adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to preside over a human rights complaint brought by a unionized worker in Manitoba. In doing so, the SCC affirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators to decide disputes arising from the collective agreement under provincial labour legislation, in the absence of clear legislative intent to grant concurrent jurisdiction to another decision-making body.

Background

Ms. Horrocks was a unionized healthcare worker, employed by the Northern Regional Health Authority (NRHA). She was subject to a collective agreement, which provided that discrimination on the basis of “mental or physical disability” was forbidden. After being suspended for attending work while under the influence of alcohol, Ms. Horrocks disclosed her alcohol dependency to the NRHA. The NRHA terminated Ms. Horrocks’ employment upon her refusal to enter into an agreement requiring her to abstain from alcohol and obtain addiction treatment. Ms. Horrocks’ union grieved her termination. This resulted in her reinstatement under certain conditions that, once again, included abstinence and treatment. The NRHA subsequently terminated Ms. Horrocks’ employment due to her alleged violation of these terms.

Instead of filing a grievance under the collective agreement regarding her second termination, Ms. Horrocks brought a complaint to the Manitoba Human Rights Commission (the Commission) under Manitoba’s Human Rights Code (the Code), alleging she had been discriminated against on the basis of disability in the form of addiction. 

The NRHA contested the jurisdiction of the human rights adjudicator, taking the position that a labour arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising under the collective agreement. Despite this claim, the chief adjudicator determined she had jurisdiction and found that the NRHA had discriminated against Ms. Horrocks.

The SCC decision

Upon judicial review, the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench set aside the chief adjudicator’s decision, which was then overturned by the Manitoba Court of Appeal. At the SCC, Justice Brown, writing on behalf of the majority, allowed the NRHA’s appeal and set aside the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s decision. According to the majority, SCC precedent has consistently affirmed labour arbitrators’ exclusive jurisdiction where labour relations statutes include a provision for the final settlement of disputes under the collective agreement.

Referencing specific SCC jurisprudence, including Weber v. Ontario Hydro,² Justice Brown held that a two-step analysis is required when resolving a jurisdictional conflict between a labour arbitrator and a statutory tribunal:

• First, the relevant legislative schemes are to be examined to determine whether a labour arbitrator has been granted exclusive jurisdiction and what matters are covered by any exclusive jurisdiction conferred. In the case of labour legislation, a mandatory dispute resolution clause often provides that a labour arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction to determine disputes related to the interpretation, application or violation of a collective agreement. This exclusive jurisdiction may only be ousted through clear legislative intent expressing the contrary.
• Second, if the legislation grants exclusive jurisdiction to a labour arbitrator, it must be determined whether the dispute at issue is captured by the scope of that jurisdiction. This requires reviewing the collective agreement and the factual context underlying the dispute, rather than how the dispute has been legally characterized.  

Applying this analysis to the case at hand, at the first step, the majority examined Manitoba’s Labour Relations Act (the Act) and the Code. The Act contains a mandatory dispute resolution clause, which indicates legislative intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising under the collective agreement to a labour arbitrator under the collective agreement. Meanwhile, the Code does not clearly displace this exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the Act. Thus, the Code falls short of granting concurrent jurisdiction over human rights disputes arising under the collective agreement. 

Moving to the second step, Justice Brown characterized the essential character of the dispute as one arising from the interpretation, application or violation of the collective agreement between Ms. Horrocks’ union and the NRHA. Specifically, Ms. Horrocks’ complaint concerned NRHA’s failure to exercise its management rights in accordance with the limits prescribed by the collective agreement and legislation, including the Code. While Ms. Horrocks had legally characterized her complaint as a human rights violation, the underlying factual context was related to how her employer had exercised its management rights under the collective agreement.

Citing Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2001) (also known as Naraine), an Ontario Court of Appeal decision, Justice Brown acknowledged that certain appellate courts have held that, due to the paramount status of human rights legislation, clear language is necessary to displace a human rights tribunal’s jurisdiction. While declining to comment on the correctness of such an approach, Justice Brown emphasized that the inclusion of a mandatory dispute resolution clause within a labour relations statute clearly indicates the legislature’s intent to override the application of human rights legislation.

Takeaway

In Horrocks, the majority of the SCC clearly recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators over human rights disputes which, in their essential character, arise from the interpretation, application or violation of a collective agreement in Manitoba. The decision also calls into question the continued application of Naraine and other appellate decisions, which have previously acknowledged the concurrent jurisdiction of human rights adjudicators in other provinces across Canada. 

It remains to be seen whether provincial courts outside Manitoba will embrace the approach to arbitral exclusivity put forward in Horrocks or distinguish this precedent based on differences found in provincial human rights statutes. As indicated in dissent by Justice Karakatsanis, in comparison to the Manitoba Code, human rights statutes in Ontario, British Columbia and the federal jurisdiction include more explicit clauses contemplating the deferral of an application to another proceeding. 

Accordingly, while not explicit, the statutory schemes in these provinces may reveal the legislatures’ intent to grant human rights adjudicators concurrent jurisdiction in matters that could also be subject to the grievance process. Given the significance of the issues at play, the implications of this decision are sure to become apparent in the near future.